LIVE
TASKS 24H6,48165 policiesCOMPLIANT0.0%0 attestedOPERATORS32 signingRESTAKED4e-15 NEWT—MEDIAN RESPONSE36sp99 48.0sRE-VERIFIED 24H—0 invalidatedBLOCK11,957,998Sepolia
NEWTON PROTOCOL · POLICY CLIENT

0xbf07…7149revision 1 · current

0xbf07c6a947b131be939e060fe1bf43500c067149 · 1 of 8 policies · Sepolia
REVISION
1 of 1
POLICIES
1 of 8
DISTINCT
1
RESPONSE EXPIRY
25 blocks
CHAIN
Sepolia
TASKS · 24H
0
ALLOW RATE
50.0%
Every policy must allowFail-closed, and no short-circuit: every policy is evaluated even after one has denied, and a single denial denies the intent. The response expires 25 blocks after its reference block — the shortest expireAfter in the set, on slot 0.

Policies — 1

one Rego + WASM pair per slot
  1. 0
    0x6cc19a9cb5b90f8065886aaf744049a276755c840x6cc1…5c84not in factory registry25 blocksbounds set expiry
    wasmnone — pure Regorego
    — rules— denyno WASMspecHash 0xebefd96c…
    check_kycnot in schemafalse
    check_ofacnot in schemafalse
    check_fraudnot in schematrue
    policyParams — 58 bytes on chain0x7b22636865636b5f6f666163223a66616c73652c22636865636b5f6b7963223a66616c73652c22636865636b5f6672617564223a747275657d0a
Each module is evaluated against its own input — {"params": <this slot’s policyParams>, "wasm": <this slot’s WASM output>}. There is no shared data.wasm object and no cross-slot namespace, so slot 1 cannot read slot 0’s WASM output and a policy cannot be written to depend on its neighbours.
SET IDENTITY
POLICY_SET_DOMAINkeccak256("newton.policy.set")
chainId11155111
revision1
policies0x6cc1…5c84@25
Task managerreads getPolicies() at task creation, then never again
policyId = keccak256(abi.encode(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies)), where policies is the complete ordered array with each entry’s parameters and expiry. Order is part of it, so a reorder alone is a new id.
WHAT A TASK FREEZES
A task carries this exact ordered set as its own snapshot, plus one WASM input per slot. Response validation reads that snapshot and never re-reads the client, so reconfiguring mid-flight cannot change what an in-flight task means — and replay proves it by recomputing the policyId over the snapshot and comparing against the task’s own.
The bound is MAX_POLICIES = 8, enforced on chain and mirrored in the operator, the enclave and the proof guest. An oversize set is rejected, never truncated, and an empty one is rejected too — there is no vacuous allow.

Configuration history

1 write · newest first
RevPolicy setChangePoliciesConfigured byBlockTasks
1 · current0x09473785…28b9first set0x6cc19a9cb5b90f8065886aaf744049a276755c84—11,782,0950xda4d…ad806
Every write mints a new policyId and revokes every attestation bound to the previous one, because the id commits the client, the chain, the revision counter and the exact ordered list — keccak256(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies). Revision 1 is the only one whose attestations are still spendable.

Task history — every revision

6 of 6 matchingExport CSVJSON
TaskSenderPolicyFunctionSignersResultAge
The export carries one row per task with the frozen policy set in slot order, and it is the complete filtered history rather than this page. It has no per-policy verdict column: TaskResponse.allowed is a single boolean for the whole set, so which policy denied a task is in no record.