LIVE
TASKS 24H6,48165 policiesCOMPLIANT0.0%0 attestedOPERATORS32 signingRESTAKED4e-15 NEWT—MEDIAN RESPONSE36sp99 48.0sRE-VERIFIED 24H—0 invalidatedBLOCK11,957,998Sepolia
NEWTON PROTOCOL · POLICY CLIENT

0x65cc…4f10revision 2 · current

0x65cc59bb687884657b0bf772736a934da7bd4f10 · 1 of 8 policies · Sepolia
REVISION
2 of 2
POLICIES
1 of 8
DISTINCT
1
RESPONSE EXPIRY
300 blocks
CHAIN
Sepolia
TASKS · 24H
0
ALLOW RATE
0.0%
Every policy must allowFail-closed, and no short-circuit: every policy is evaluated even after one has denied, and a single denial denies the intent. The response expires 300 blocks after its reference block — the shortest expireAfter in the set, on slot 0.

Policies — 1

one Rego + WASM pair per slot
  1. 0
    0x75e6ce3a25b874fc4ef24125ec827ec410c477a60x75e6…77a6not in factory registry300 blocksbounds set expiry
    wasmnone — pure Regorego
    — rules— denyno WASMspecHash 0xb52c3d53…
    adminnot in schema0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001
    allowed_chain_idsnot in schema["11155111"]
    allowed_contractsnot in schema["0xb1ad5f82407bc0f19f42b2614fb9083035a36b69"]
    allowed_functionsnot in schema["buy"]
    policyParams — 200 bytes on chain0x7b0a20202261646d696e223a2022307830303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303031222c0a202022616c6c6f7765645f636861696e5f696473223a205b223131313535313131225d2c0a202022616c6c6f7765645f636f6e747261637473223a205b22307862316164356638323430376263306631396634326232363134666239303833303335613336623639225d2c0a202022616c6c6f7765645f66756e6374696f6e73223a205b22627579225d0a7d0a
Each module is evaluated against its own input — {"params": <this slot’s policyParams>, "wasm": <this slot’s WASM output>}. There is no shared data.wasm object and no cross-slot namespace, so slot 1 cannot read slot 0’s WASM output and a policy cannot be written to depend on its neighbours.
SET IDENTITY
POLICY_SET_DOMAINkeccak256("newton.policy.set")
chainId11155111
revision2
policies0x75e6…77a6@300
Task managerreads getPolicies() at task creation, then never again
policyId = keccak256(abi.encode(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies)), where policies is the complete ordered array with each entry’s parameters and expiry. Order is part of it, so a reorder alone is a new id.
WHAT A TASK FREEZES
A task carries this exact ordered set as its own snapshot, plus one WASM input per slot. Response validation reads that snapshot and never re-reads the client, so reconfiguring mid-flight cannot change what an in-flight task means — and replay proves it by recomputing the policyId over the snapshot and comparing against the task’s own.
The bound is MAX_POLICIES = 8, enforced on chain and mirrored in the operator, the enclave and the proof guest. An oversize set is rejected, never truncated, and an empty one is rejected too — there is no vacuous allow.

Configuration history

2 writes · newest first
RevPolicy setChangePoliciesConfigured byBlockTasks
2 · current0xf5781a6d…5ecbidentical re-apply0x75e6ce3a25b874fc4ef24125ec827ec410c477a6—11,769,9990x33d5…280a0
10x2e78001a…325bfirst set0x5c141295bae0c15b9ffc712288bebfbba8e1161d—11,759,7580xdcfc…55df0
Every write mints a new policyId and revokes every attestation bound to the previous one, because the id commits the client, the chain, the revision counter and the exact ordered list — keccak256(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies). Revision 2 is the only one whose attestations are still spendable. One write here re-applied a byte-identical list. PoliciesUpdated fires anyway and the revision advances anyway, so that write changed nothing about the policies and still killed every outstanding authorization.

Task history — every revision

3 of 3 matchingExport CSVJSON
TaskSenderPolicyFunctionSignersResultAge
The export carries one row per task with the frozen policy set in slot order, and it is the complete filtered history rather than this page. It has no per-policy verdict column: TaskResponse.allowed is a single boolean for the whole set, so which policy denied a task is in no record.