LIVE
TASKS 24H065 policiesCOMPLIANT0.0%0 attestedOPERATORS32 signingRESTAKED4e-15 NEWT—MEDIAN RESPONSE36sp99 48.0sRE-VERIFIED 24H—0 invalidatedBLOCK11,958,580Sepolia
NEWTON PROTOCOL · POLICY CLIENT

0x57f4…8d18revision 4 · current

0x57f4fb0a4a4b34ea51d47bc7c99c960b80a58d18 · 1 of 8 policies · Sepolia
REVISION
4 of 4
POLICIES
1 of 8
DISTINCT
1
RESPONSE EXPIRY
300 blocks
CHAIN
Sepolia
TASKS · 24H
0
ALLOW RATE
0.0%
Every policy must allowFail-closed, and no short-circuit: every policy is evaluated even after one has denied, and a single denial denies the intent. The response expires 300 blocks after its reference block — the shortest expireAfter in the set, on slot 0.

Policies — 1

one Rego + WASM pair per slot
  1. 0
    0xd0ff7aca199aeacc5f316b029a476da7684a38770xd0ff…3877not in factory registry300 blocksbounds set expiry
    wasmnone — pure Regorego
    — rules— denyno WASMspecHash 0x406f6dd0…
    max_list_age_secondsnot in schema691200
    policyParams — 36 bytes on chain0x7b0a2020226d61785f6c6973745f6167655f7365636f6e6473223a203639313230300a7d
Each module is evaluated against its own input — {"params": <this slot’s policyParams>, "wasm": <this slot’s WASM output>}. There is no shared data.wasm object and no cross-slot namespace, so slot 1 cannot read slot 0’s WASM output and a policy cannot be written to depend on its neighbours.
SET IDENTITY
POLICY_SET_DOMAINkeccak256("newton.policy.set")
chainId11155111
revision4
policies0xd0ff…3877@300
Task managerreads getPolicies() at task creation, then never again
policyId = keccak256(abi.encode(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies)), where policies is the complete ordered array with each entry’s parameters and expiry. Order is part of it, so a reorder alone is a new id.
WHAT A TASK FREEZES
A task carries this exact ordered set as its own snapshot, plus one WASM input per slot. Response validation reads that snapshot and never re-reads the client, so reconfiguring mid-flight cannot change what an in-flight task means — and replay proves it by recomputing the policyId over the snapshot and comparing against the task’s own.
The bound is MAX_POLICIES = 8, enforced on chain and mirrored in the operator, the enclave and the proof guest. An oversize set is rejected, never truncated, and an empty one is rejected too — there is no vacuous allow.

Configuration history

4 writes · newest first
RevPolicy setChangePoliciesConfigured byBlockTasks
4 · current0xdb7b1ec2…674didentical re-apply0xd0ff7aca199aeacc5f316b029a476da7684a3877—11,877,2130x4ad4…04e340
30x10596ed0…0a2cidentical re-apply0x95c66b29db62136094dc95e40c33cc524cfe4ba1—11,877,1930x73e4…a3870
20x34cb95f2…acd0identical re-apply0xd0ff7aca199aeacc5f316b029a476da7684a3877—11,877,1890xadd9…161c2
10x34addc48…adedfirst set0x95c66b29db62136094dc95e40c33cc524cfe4ba1—11,799,7020xaea7…3bf116
Every write mints a new policyId and revokes every attestation bound to the previous one, because the id commits the client, the chain, the revision counter and the exact ordered list — keccak256(POLICY_SET_DOMAIN, chainId, client, revision, policies). Revision 4 is the only one whose attestations are still spendable. One write here re-applied a byte-identical list. PoliciesUpdated fires anyway and the revision advances anyway, so that write changed nothing about the policies and still killed every outstanding authorization.

Task history — every revision

50 of 58 matchingExport CSVJSON
TaskSenderPolicyFunctionSignersResultAge
← Newer50 per page · newest firstOlder →
The export carries one row per task with the frozen policy set in slot order, and it is the complete filtered history rather than this page. It has no per-policy verdict column: TaskResponse.allowed is a single boolean for the whole set, so which policy denied a task is in no record.