Task 0xe8f7a3b7… · Newton Explorer

This task’s policy set has been superseded. It is bound to revision 0 of 0x01c23a28…11930767, and the client has written a newer one since — so the attestation is revoked regardless of its expiration block. Everything below still replays: the task froze this exact ordered set, and replay recomputes the policyId over that snapshot rather than re-reading the client.

SENDER

0xd232c8d0…2547df1a

POLICY CLIENT

0x01c23a28…11930767

POLICY SET

—

POLICIES

0 · 0 with WASM

CHAIN

Sepolia · 11155111

EVALUATION

NON-COMPLIANT

QUORUM

— of stake · threshold 40%

CREATED

2026-10-19 04:35:02 UTC

PROOF STATE

Pending

ATTESTATION EXPIRES

Block —

CHALLENGE WINDOW

Closes block — · 30 blocks

CHALLENGEABLEOpen for challenge until block —.

Anyone may re-evaluate this policy and submit a zero-knowledge proof that the result is wrong — challenge submission is permissionless. A successful challenge voids the attestation and slashes every operator that signed it.

01 — CHAIN OF CUSTODY

04:35:02.210 UTCSubmittedOff-chain ingestion timestamp, carried on chain in the taskTask0xe8f7a3b7fe8b92317d407e24203647eee712408aa6acc60bb53b44c663d2beeeBlock11945838

02 — INTENT

No ABI available for selector 0x66756e6374696f6e20617474657374526573657276652875696e743235362065717569747955736443656e74732c2075696e7432353620736e617073686f7454696d654d732c20737472696e672063616c6356657273696f6e29 — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.

03 — ATTESTATION · BLS AGGREGATE (alt_bn128)

attestation— — not yet responded

04 — OPERATOR SET · WHO SIGNED

of operators · — of stake · threshold 40%

Operator	BLS pubkey (G1)	Stake weight	In aggregate

One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.

05 — TEE · NOT APPLICABLE

No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.

06 — POLICIES · FROZEN AT CREATION

Slot	Policy	WASM output	expireAfter

Which policy denied is not recorded. TaskResponse carries a single bool allowed for the whole set — every policy above was evaluated, and one denial was enough — and no per-policy result. Re-running newt_simulatePolicy against this client returns a per-policy breakdown, but that is a simulation of the set as configured now, not a record of this task.

Each slot links to the policy whose module ran in it. The bytes are from TaskResponse.rego[i], not from the policy’s current CID — every one hashes to that policy’s immutable policyCodeHash, which the chain checks before accepting a response.

07 — VERIFY INDEPENDENTLY

newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x0dbd6e44a1814f5efe4f67a00b7f28642e3064dd --client 0x01C23A281c3290F24211BC2bB2a2cDcD11930767

The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block —. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.

SEAL

Issued —
Receipt hash

Transfer blocked