LIVE
TASKS 24H065 policiesCOMPLIANT0.0%0 attestedOPERATORS32 signingRESTAKED4e-15 NEWT—MEDIAN RESPONSE36sp99 48.0sRE-VERIFIED 24H—0 invalidatedBLOCK11,958,297Sepolia
NEWTON PROTOCOL · AUTHORIZATION RECEIPT

Transfer blocked

TASK 0xc07c0075791c232ed284573bc0158e53b24bded03c72977fef0512a75f480e06
NON-COMPLIANT
PROOF NOT ISSUED · SETTLED
This task’s policy set has been superseded. It is bound to revision 4 of 0xfa2b8f04…45732880, and the client has written a newer one since — so the attestation is revoked regardless of its expiration block. Everything below still replays: the task froze this exact ordered set, and replay recomputes the policyId over that snapshot rather than re-reading the client. See the set as this task froze it →
SENDER
0x74422d30…47d5a36e
POLICY CLIENT
POLICIES
1 · 1 with WASM · 0xe3c0…0c50
CHAIN
Sepolia · 11155111
EVALUATION
NON-COMPLIANT
QUORUM
100.0% of stake · threshold 40%
CREATED
2026-10-15 08:54:00 UTC
PROOF STATE
Not issued
ATTESTATION EXPIRES
Block 11,919,668
CHALLENGE WINDOW
Closes block 11,919,398 · 30 blocks
SETTLEDThe challenge window closed at block 11,919,398 with no successful challenge.

Every challenger watching this chain independently re-evaluated the policy against the same inputs and none could produce a proof that the result differs. This is final: the window cannot be reopened.

01 — CHAIN OF CUSTODY
08:54:00Z UTCSubmittedOff-chain ingestion timestamp, carried on chain in the taskTask0xc07c0075791c232ed284573bc0158e53b24bded03c72977fef0512a75f480e06Block11919365
08:54:00Z UTCAggregatedQuorum signature aggregated and the response submitted
02 — INTENT

No ABI available for selector function addLiquidity(address currency0, address currency1, uint24 fee, int24 tickSpacing, int24 tickLower, int24 tickUpper, uint256 liquidity) — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.

03 — ATTESTATION · BLS AGGREGATE (alt_bn128)
taskId0xc07c0075791c232ed284573bc0158e53b24bded03c72977fef0512a75f480e06
policyId0x19ef800b96e09d63078a8af7f945ac16f24cdcfacd21610ac98c067f97f8f9fb
allowedfalse — NON-COMPLIANT, covering all 1 policy
consensusDigest—
fullDigest—
aggregateSignature0x0a21facb… (G1) · 0x130bbc26… (G2) — alt_bn128 pairing verified onchain
nonSignerPubkeys0 of 2 —
expirationBlock11,919,668
referenceBlockNumber11,919,368
04 — OPERATOR SET · WHO SIGNED
2 of 2 operators · 100.0% of stake · threshold 40%
OperatorBLS pubkey (G1)Stake weightIn aggregate
0x08aba45185d7ff3439c64a9e55fbbc1598d7e0f1739611697b96915125e7156d14ede618ea86190f0b76522ea14bf91faa3a71d8aed8b321e0ca6d4f0bf4194750.0%SIGNED
0x0cca695f21256f1b8b39517c7298aa343513ca0615fbab9fe667582d03fdd6a12f54543ff1bd0015182d3685d08ccdc611208d1cb42ef2ad89590829a5f4314850.0%SIGNED

One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.

05 — TEE · NOT APPLICABLE

No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.

06 — POLICIES · FROZEN AT CREATION
SlotPolicyWASM outputexpireAfter
00xe3c043a6039ac44c69f23e2db5ad09e96f220c50 · 0xe3c043a6…0c500x7b2261646472657373223a22307837343432326433306238633563316439393165346164613132633263343466613437643561333665222c226174746573746f72223a22307832343438393735373233363865616466363562666263356165633938643865353434336139303732222c22636865636b6564223a747275652c22636c61696d5f6964223a22307861303563333133656132613932313966383865346435326262653937616437323366383837656136353234333334363164333032313531383431393562326533222c22636f6e746578745f61646472657373223a22307866613262386630343565623530636336663865313365383265313061343165663435373332383830222c22636f7665726564223a2230222c22636f76657265645f686578223a2230303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030222c226c6973746564223a66616c73652c227368656574223a2268747470733a2f2f646f63732e676f6f676c652e636f6d2f7370726561647368656574732f642f316c5433636d7a744737647854676e4e4469565a6a624538345548744b6f67483037573658576e624a6432592f6776697a2f74713f7471783d6f75743a637376222c2274696d657374616d70223a313739323035343432367d300sets response expiry
Which policy denied is not recorded. TaskResponse carries a single bool allowed for the whole set — every policy above was evaluated, and one denial was enough — and no per-policy result. Re-running newt_simulatePolicy against this client returns a per-policy breakdown, but that is a simulation of the set as configured now, not a record of this task.
07 — VERIFY INDEPENDENTLY
newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x0dbd6e44a1814f5efe4f67a00b7f28642e3064dd --client 0xfa2B8F045EB50Cc6F8e13E82e10A41Ef45732880

The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block 11,919,368. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.

SEAL
Issued 2026-10-15 08:54:00Z UTC
Receipt hash