Task 0x6c2c1605… · Newton Explorer

This task’s policy set has been superseded. It is bound to revision 1 of 0x63be3d34…0f1a72ed, and the client has written a newer one since — so the attestation is revoked regardless of its expiration block. Everything below still replays: the task froze this exact ordered set, and replay recomputes the policyId over that snapshot rather than re-reading the client. See the set as this task froze it →

SENDER

0xcbce5d04…dfaa03ad

POLICY CLIENT

0x63be3d34…0f1a72ed

POLICY SET

0x87a92388…c870 · rev 1

POLICIES

2 · 1 with WASM · 0xa1cc…45ef, 0x068d…2ace

CHAIN

Sepolia · 11155111

EVALUATION

COMPLIANT

QUORUM

100.0% of stake · threshold 40%

CREATED

2026-09-29 23:24:24 UTC

PROOF STATE

Pending

ATTESTATION EXPIRES

Block —

CHALLENGE WINDOW

Closes block — · 30 blocks

CHALLENGEABLEOpen for challenge until block —.

Anyone may re-evaluate this policy and submit a zero-knowledge proof that the result is wrong — challenge submission is permissionless. A successful challenge voids the attestation and slashes every operator that signed it.

01 — CHAIN OF CUSTODY

23:24:24Z UTCSubmittedOff-chain ingestion timestamp, carried on chain in the taskTask0x6c2c1605b33487793f65f61801c8de70f64e4c4b07bbed348f19e349c271fbacBlock11810794

23:24:24Z UTCAggregatedQuorum signature aggregated and the response submitted

02 — INTENT

No ABI available for selector reallocate(address,address,uint256) — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.

03 — ATTESTATION · BLS AGGREGATE (alt_bn128)

taskId0x6c2c1605b33487793f65f61801c8de70f64e4c4b07bbed348f19e349c271fbac

policyId0x87a923888debcaceb969c170da517cc1298e51e3a16c107cf2a84d5adf0fc870

allowedtrue — COMPLIANT, covering all 2 policies

consensusDigest—

fullDigest—

aggregateSignature—

nonSignerPubkeys0 of 2 —

expirationBlock—

referenceBlockNumber—

04 — OPERATOR SET · WHO SIGNED

2 of 2 operators · 100.0% of stake · threshold 40%

Operator	BLS pubkey (G1)	Stake weight	In aggregate
	0x08aba45185d7ff3439c64a9e55fbbc1598d7e0f1739611697b96915125e7156d14ede618ea86190f0b76522ea14bf91faa3a71d8aed8b321e0ca6d4f0bf41947	50.0%	SIGNED
	0x0cca695f21256f1b8b39517c7298aa343513ca0615fbab9fe667582d03fdd6a12f54543ff1bd0015182d3685d08ccdc611208d1cb42ef2ad89590829a5f43148	50.0%	SIGNED

One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.

05 — TEE · NOT APPLICABLE

No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.

06 — POLICIES · FROZEN AT CREATION

Slot	Policy	WASM output	expireAfter
0	0xa1cca533c467aff17f2226ed6dddbbb92d4745ef · 0xa1cca533…45ef	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	50sets response expiry
1	0x068d12614db2b7d097c85f9f649a419f113d2ace · 0x068d1261…2ace	0x — pure Rego, canonically empty	50sets response expiry

Each slot links to the policy whose module ran in it. The bytes are from TaskResponse.rego[i], not from the policy’s current CID — every one hashes to that policy’s immutable policyCodeHash, which the chain checks before accepting a response.

07 — VERIFY INDEPENDENTLY

newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x0dbd6e44a1814f5efe4f67a00b7f28642e3064dd --client 0x63BE3d34757470f9e4F7c8D2326469d90f1a72eD

The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block —. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.

SEAL

Issued 2026-09-29 23:24:24Z UTC
Receipt hash

Transfer authorized