Transfer authorized
Anyone may re-evaluate this policy and submit a zero-knowledge proof that the result is wrong — challenge submission is permissionless. A successful challenge voids the attestation and slashes every operator that signed it.
No ABI available for selector ping() — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.
One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.
No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.
| Slot | Policy | WASM output | expireAfter |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0x59d46e1d98f4038cca022e719e7555319db4b969 · 0x59d46e1d…b969 | 0x — pure Rego, canonically empty | 25sets response expiry |
newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x0dbd6e44a1814f5efe4f67a00b7f28642e3064dd --client 0x1785774f58618F874efCC19bC0e72c6eA2B4AA16
The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block —. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.
Receipt hash